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THEORISING MEDIA/
STATE RELATIONS
AND POWER

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The media are often understood to be simply an extension of state power in non-democratic, non-Western countries. They are therefore sometimes viewed as implicated in war crimes – such as in Rwanda, where three media executives were convicted by the United Nations’ (UN’s) international criminal tribunal for having incited genocide in 1994. The media can also be treated as legitimate military targets – as during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed the main television building in central Belgrade, killing the civilian employees inside. In both of these cases, the assumption was that the role of the media in conflict is to act as an instrument of power, whether they are state-run (as in the Serbian case) or privately owned (as in Rwanda). In Western democracies, in contrast, the assumption is that the media (including national broadcasters such as the BBC) are independent: able to act as a watchdog on the powerful rather than simply being an arm of official authority.

Yet there is a long tradition of critical scholarship which questions this view. Analysts have argued that the range of opinions available in the free Western media is constricted, ‘indexed’ to the views of elite sources (Bennett 1990); that debate is limited to a narrow sphere of ‘legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1989); and that the news media – especially in coverage of foreign policy and war – produce propaganda rather than independent journalism (Herman and Chomsky 2002). For many critics, these problems are not contingent – a product of war fever or patriotism, say – but are systemic, and derive from the fundamental characteristics of the media in capitalist democracies.

This chapter will review the key claims of this radical tradition, but the main aim in what follows is to assess how far it remains useful for understanding news coverage of contemporary conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious reason its relevance has been doubted in recent years is that new online communications seem to call into question the importance of theorising how and why the news media serve the interests of power. If activists in repressive states can circumvent or challenge state propaganda, as in Egypt or Libya during the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’, we might expect even greater freedom in democratic societies. Recent work on how the conduct of war has been transformed by a ‘new media ecology characterized by connectivity, emergence and contingency’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010: 168), suggests to
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some analysts that the goal of demonstrating how mainstream print and broadcast media are subservient to power is much less important.

The radical critique

It is slightly misleading to write of ‘the’ critical or radical tradition, but there is not space here for a detailed exposition of differences of approach and emphasis. Instead, this section will attempt to draw out some common themes in relation to three key issues for understanding the media/state relationship: official constraint and manipulation of the media; patterns of media ownership and commercialisation; and the professional practices and routines of journalism itself. The best illustration of the overall approach is Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model, because of both its comprehensive scope and its frequent citation in studies of war reporting.

Of these three issues, the first might be thought to be the most significant in war coverage, and indeed there is no shortage of studies detailing the long and sorry history of efforts by Western governments, militaries and intelligence services to manipulate, censor and control the news in wartime (see Knightley 2003 for a historical overview). The potential scope of coercive state power over the media should not be underestimated. In the 1980s the British government commandeered a BBC transmitter on Ascension Island to broadcast black propaganda to Argentine troops during the Falklands conflict (Harris 1983: 119), for example, and at home it banned the broadcasting of statements by Irish Republican political leaders (Miller 1995). In legal provisions for ‘defence and emergency arrangements’, the British government has the power to require the BBC to broadcast any material it chooses, or to prevent it from broadcasting any material. It can also require the BBC to act as an ‘agent of the Crown’ in monitoring and reporting on others’ media output; and, while the BBC’s domestic services are funded by licence-fee payers, the Corporation receives direct government funding for the World Service and is answerable to the Foreign Office for its overseas programming.

However, the radical tradition starts from the fact that in Western democracies direct state censorship and control of the news media is the exception rather than the rule. This is not because Western states are seen as benign – to the contrary, critics such as Herman and Chomsky are centrally concerned with how the media work as a propaganda system to legitimise the nefarious activities of the US and other Western governments. Rather, the point is to explain how the media generally do this spontaneously with relatively little direct state control. As Ralph Miliband wrote in 1969: ‘In no field do the claims of democratic diversity and free political competition which are made on behalf of the “open societies” of advanced capitalism appear to be more valid than in the field of communications.’ Nevertheless, he went on to observe, the media are ‘a crucial element in the legitimation of capitalist society’, supporting ‘the prevailing system of power and privilege’ and fostering a ‘climate of conformity’ (Miliband 2013). Explaining this apparent paradox is at the heart of the radical critique.

Herman and Chomsky identify five ‘news filters’ which ‘allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public’ (2002: 2). Notably, the first two of these – ‘size, ownership and profit orientation’, and ‘the advertising licence to do business’ – concern the nature of the news media as private businesses. In other words, it is simply the character of media themselves as capitalist enterprises, and their enmeshing with other private businesses, which does most to explain how they tend to work routinely in ways which support the socio-economic status quo. As in other sectors, the media industry
has seen a trend toward increased concentration of ownership and large-scale investment by other major companies and banks, but unlike most other sectors of the economy, in the case of news media this has potentially far-reaching effects on the public sphere in terms of the quality of information and range of opinion available to citizens. The importance of attracting advertising revenue also means that the media are less likely to carry content which might alienate either their sponsors or their more affluent readers and viewers.

In foregrounding the importance of the media’s business interests, Herman and Chomsky are squarely in the tradition of ‘political economy’ analysts, such as Herbert Schiller (1976) in the US or Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1974) in the UK. Although they are addressing a US context, it is worth noting that Herman and Chomsky draw extensively on British press history (as told in James Curran and Jean Seaton’s (2010) *Power without Responsibility*) to illustrate their argument. Indeed, one of the most striking examples of how interlocking interests can shape the media’s relationship with power is the behaviour of Rupert Murdoch’s News International in the UK in the 1980s. In the bitter year-long Wapping dispute, when more than 5,000 print workers were sacked in a bid to end trades-union influence, there was a clear convergence between the commercial interests of News International and the aggressively anti-trades-union programme of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. The editorial support for the Conservatives offered by Murdoch’s papers throughout the decade was reciprocated by government (and police) support for News International against its employees.

Herman and Chomsky (2002: 18–19) also suggest that economic considerations are one of the factors underpinning the media’s reliance on a narrow range of official sources (their third ‘filter’), since the public relations bureaucracies of state and corporate sources offer a ready supply of authoritative news. An over-reliance on official sources is a well-established feature of routine journalism, but is particularly pronounced in coverage of war and conflict, when the range of opinions and views aired in the media tend to be even more closely ‘indexed’ to those of the political mainstream (Mermin 1999). Herman and Chomsky (2002: 19) note that this is in part a result of the established professional conventions of ‘objective’ journalism, used strategically by reporters to protect themselves and their employers from charges of bias (Tuchman 1972). As Daniel Hallin (1989: 25) observes in his study of coverage of Vietnam, ‘The effect of “objectivity” was not to free the news of political influence, but to open wide the channel through which official influence flowed.’

Although a (mistaken) perception of media disloyalty led to greater official efforts to control and censor news in post-Vietnam conflicts, a more cooperative relationship began to develop in the 1990s. Government and military attempts to manage the media have, in more recent years, tended to work more through informal and indirect methods of influence, such as choosing which correspondents to accredit, embedding reporters with military units, offering formal and informal briefings, and generally attempting to co-opt the media rather than simply repress them. As their fourth filter, Herman and Chomsky include both direct and indirect ‘flak’ from powerful voices seeking to bring the media into line if they stray off message. While overt censorship is relatively rare even in wartime, flak is standard operating procedure: UK political leaders sharply criticised BBC journalists for treating Argentine and British claims too even-handedly in the Falklands (Harris 1983: 75), for becoming the ‘Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation’ in the 1991 Gulf war (Keeble 1997: 168), and for acting as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the Serbian authorities in the Kosovo conflict (Hammond 2000: 126), for example.

The point of such criticisms is to define the scope of acceptable debate; the bounds within which journalistic ‘balance’ can operate. Ideas or views which fall outside the range of what
Hallin (1989: 117) calls ‘legitimate controversy’, are excluded or marginalised as ‘deviant’. This is also the key to understanding Herman and Chomsky’s final filter, ‘anti-communism’. Since the Cold War ended soon after the first publication of Herman and Chomsky’s *Manufacturing Consent* in 1988, this has long been seen as needing to be updated, and various alternative enemies (particularly radical Islamism) have been suggested as substitutes for the Soviets. Herman (2000: 109) himself, however, has argued that in a world ‘where non-market solutions seem utopian’, journalists have internalised the belief that ‘markets are… benevolent and non-market mechanisms are suspect’. The original proposition was less to do with unity against enemy hate-figures, important though this is in wartime propaganda, and more to do with underlying shared beliefs. As Hallin (1989: 117) suggests, ‘the journalist’s role is to serve as an advocate and celebrant of consensus values’ (see also Hall 1973: 88).

Herman and Chomsky devote most of their book to empirical evidence supporting and illustrating the model, focusing on the reporting of war, conflict and international affairs. Their approach typically involves examining paired examples to show how news coverage of conflict generally follows the interests of Western governments in either highlighting suffering and atrocities or looking the other way and excusing them, as appropriate – for instance in the different treatment of conflict in Libya in 2011 compared with Sri Lanka in 2008–9 (Herman and Peterson 2011: xiv–xvii). Yet despite naming it a ‘propaganda model’, it was not intended as narrowly applicable only to the behaviour of the media in wartime, which is perhaps what we mostly associate with the term propaganda. Rather, the point was to challenge the assumed contrast, much like that pointed up at the start of this chapter, between the propaganda systems of authoritarian states and the free, independent media of the democratic West (Herman and Chomsky 2002: lvi).}

### The challenge of complexity

Before going on to assess the radical critique, it is important to clarify the arguments which question its relevance for today’s digital, online world. We can broadly distinguish two ways of conceptualising how new media challenge the claims of the radical tradition. The first is to argue that the pluralism claimed in liberal understandings of the media (a ‘free market of ideas’) can now finally be realised, since new media have the potential to liberate us from the distortions of monopoly ownership and the shackles of state control. The second approach draws on complexity theory to argue that the new media ecology which we now inhabit problematises previous understandings of media and power, and that neither the radical critique nor traditional liberal ideas are adequate to explain our new situation. This section will deal with each of these in turn, but the second argument, elaborated specifically in relation to war reporting by Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2010), will be the main focus, since it presents the more fundamental challenge to theorising media/state relations and power.

The claim that the ‘transformative impact of new media technologies’ has produced a ‘radically pluralised information sphere’ has been tested by Piers Robinson et al. (2010: 79) in their systematic analysis of coverage of the 2003 Iraq war. As one would expect both from the radical critique and from previous empirical studies of war reporting, they found that ‘official sources and actors dominated television and press coverage and ensured that the story of the invasion was narrated largely through the voice of the coalition’ (Robinson et al. 2010: 80). This elite dominance of ‘old’ media remains significant, particularly in the case of television, which is still the main source of news for most people.2 ‘Old’ media organisations, moreover, are hardly at a disadvantage in the online world: of the ten news
websites with the highest monthly traffic in the US, eight are linked to established news providers such as The New York Times or CNN (Pew Research Center 2013). The picture is similar in the UK, where the BBC dominates online news consumption (Newman and Levy 2013). As with older media, online news provision seems to be following a similar pattern of concentration in the hands of a few large players. Similarly, elite efforts to influence media messages in wartime have long extended to online as well as print and broadcast media, whether through official efforts such as the US State Department’s Digital Outreach Team and the Defense Department’s Bloggers Roundtable, indirectly through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Cyber Century Forum’s ‘Spirit of America’ project, or covertly through funding and supplying politically friendly bloggers in targeted countries. As Donald Matheson and Stuart Allan (2009: 125) observe, ‘governments are aware of the advantages to be gained in using citizen media to further their military and political aims, especially where they can cloak such efforts in the mantle of independent media’. None of this is to say that the rise of new media is not highly significant, and overall it is indeed much more difficult for elites to control media messages in wartime. But there are strong empirical grounds for doubting that we are now in such a pluralistic media environment that business and state influence over the news is no longer a concern.

Nevertheless, this does not settle the matter, since one could argue that we are seeing only the beginning of trends that are likely to develop much further, and that the potential for genuine plurality could be realised in future. Moreover, while it is true that Hoskins and O’Loughlin put the idea of a ‘new media ecology’ at the centre of their argument, their approach involves more than simply a set of empirically based claims which can be tested by gathering further evidence. Robinson et al. (2010: 169) tackle claims about the impact of new technologies as part of what they call the ‘media empowerment thesis’, and link this both to a ‘wider cultural obsession with computer technology’ and to older debates such as that surrounding the ‘CNN effect’. The notion of the ‘CNN effect’ implies a reversal of the state/media relationship, whereby the media become the active partner, driving the policy agenda rather than being subservient to the political elite. What Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 85) are proposing, however, is not a reversal of power relationships, but the breakdown of ‘linear cause-and-effect models’ of communication in a world characterised by unpredictability and diffuseness. Notwithstanding their emphasis on new technologies, what is really novel in the ‘new media ecology’ they describe is not so much the extent of new media use (which may be exaggerated), but the reconceptualisation of the media as a whole as an ‘ecology’ which can be understood in terms of complexity theory, as ‘characterized by connectivity, emergence and contingency’ (2010: 168).

Complexity theory is now widely taken up across the social sciences (see Byrne and Callaghan 2014 for an overview). Complexity approaches are not making an epistemological claim, about our inability to know and predict patterns of cause and effect which are nevertheless understood to operate deterministically, but an ontological one: that the world itself consists of overlapping complex systems or processes in which we are embedded and which produce unpredictable effects and outcomes. The assemblages of complex life are not simply chaotic or disordered, but neither are they knowable according to any linear cause-and-effect models. Rather, order is an emergent property of self-organising complex systems, and is knowable only after the fact. Although Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 17) are a little unusual in dating the rise of complexity to the start of the twenty-first century and explaining its appearance as an effect of new communications technologies, their work is clearly part of this larger intellectual shift. Others have discussed how complexity theory helps us to understand developments in Western foreign policy and military strategy (Lawson 2014;
O’Kane 2006; Roderick 2007), often with the suggestion that Western states might learn from terrorist organisations who are more at home in a complex world (Bousquet 2012). Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 8–9, 12) make a similar suggestion, and argue that states and ‘Big Media’ organizations need to adapt to a world of complexity rather than hanging on to outdated linear ideas about managing communications (2010: 85). This latter point is drawn out well by Steven Corman et al., who note the ineffectiveness of America’s strategic communications efforts in the war on terror, and diagnose the problem as a 1950s-vintage ‘message influence model’. Their advice is that the US and its allies should ‘deemphasize control and embrace complexity’ (Corman et al. 2007: 15).

For our purposes, the key implication here is that media researchers also need to recognise that their models and paradigms no longer work. According to Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 185–6) all established concepts, theories and methodologies in the study of war and media have ‘imploded’ because ‘there is no stable object around which a research paradigm could cohere’. Instead, insight can come only via ‘an openness to new and emergent phenomena rather than a reification of existing institutions and structures’ (2010: 190). Tellingly, their book ends with a chapter on ‘Methods’: unlike in the traditional social-science model, where the methods section outlines how the research question will be addressed, the aim is not so much to find answers as to enrich our ability for self-reflection on how we can learn from the processes and practices of complex life. As David Chandler (2014: 221) observes in his study of complexity approaches to governance, from a complexity perspective ‘critique can no longer operate on the basis of revealing “unifying principles” such as the inner-workings of power or the supposed structures of domination’, since this would only ‘reinforce reified categories of thought’. Instead, complexity means that both researchers and political actors must adopt a very different orientation to the world: not as sovereign subjects confronting an object to be investigated or acted upon, but as reflexive subjects ‘always and already relationally-embedded in processes of emergent causality’ (2014: 222).

If we understand Hoskins and O’Loughlin as offering a particularly media-centric version of a more general intellectual vogue for complexity, this raises the question of what, if not new media, might be prompting that broader trend. A useful point of comparison here is Brian McNair’s (2005: 151) somewhat similar argument that we should abandon the idea that the media are ‘instruments of control concentrated in the hands of dominant elites’, and instead recognise that they are ‘autonomous and increasingly unruly agencies…over which those elites, including even the proprietors of big media capital, have relatively little control’. McNair makes his case in terms of the (related but different) concept of chaos, rather than complexity, but the more interesting contrast is that he recognises the importance of political factors in the changes he highlights. After 9/11 and in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, when one might have expected the ‘control paradigm’ to have been very much in evidence, elite attempts to ‘set the terms of the debate’ were, McNair argues, ‘singularly unsuccessful’, with an abundance of highly critical news coverage (2005: 156). Yet rather than seeing this as simply a media phenomenon, McNair suggests that in a ‘political environment of substantially greater volatility and uncertainty’, in which the ‘ideological dividing lines’ of the Cold War era have collapsed, elites ‘find it difficult to act as unified blocs or to exercise effective power over the media’ (McNair 2005: 157, 159, 155). While the challenge to the radical tradition’s emphasis on media subservience to the elite is similar, this is a useful corrective to media-centrism. So while for Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 188–9) the ‘emergence’ of the meaning of 9/11 from everyday practices rather than from official narratives stands as an example of how ‘life is mediatized’, McNair’s broader perspective suggests that if elite narratives lack coherence or authority this might have more to do with
the larger political context of the post-Cold War era, rather than simply being caused by new media or being a symptom of complexity.

While the further growth and development of online media will continue to be important, then, it does not really make sense to treat this in isolation and take it as the starting point of explanation: rather, its significance is shaped by broader contextual factors. Something similar might be said of the theoretical perspectives considered in this chapter: although these have been discussed in terms of paradigms and models, attempts to theorise and critique the media are also developed in specific historical contexts and take shape in response to particular conditions. As we now move on to assess the radical tradition and contemporary challenges to it, we need to consider how the meaning of critique is altered by changing circumstances.

The changing context of critique

Most of what the radical tradition said about the media – regarding their capitalist interests, dependence on advertising, reliance on official sources and vulnerability to flak – still holds true of print and broadcast media, and applies equally well to significant parts of the online world. However, the final ‘filter’, which identifies shared political values and beliefs, works at best inconsistently and intermittently today. It is true that Margaret Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no alternative’ to the market is now taken for granted, but this narrow and diminished view of the future is more like a passive background resignation than a positive celebration of common convictions. This may seem like a minor point, or perhaps even as an encouraging sign for proponents of the radical critique. But the collapse of Left/Right politics at the end of the 1980s has had far-reaching consequences, equally disorientating both for Western elites and their critics.

With the breakdown of the broader political framework of meaning through which modern societies made sense of change, public life has become hollow and unappealing, leaving Western elites increasingly isolated and, notwithstanding their incessant talk of ‘shared values’, unable to connect with and give direction to their societies. As Alexander Gourevitch (2007: 64) argues, when domestic political contestation is negligible, the ‘national interest’ becomes much harder to define, since it is ‘only when the fundamental organizing intuitions of society are challenged that the question of the national interest poses itself in a consistent way’. Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments have indeed found it ‘exceedingly difficult to define [their] “national interest”’, in the words of Condoleezza Rice (2000), producing a confusion which goes well beyond the ‘elite dissensus’ allowed for in the radical critique. Western governments have repeatedly looked to the international stage – from the announcement of a ‘New World Order’, through the elaboration of a doctrine of ‘humanitarian military intervention’, to the declaration of ‘war on terror’ – as the most promising sphere to try and work up a sense of purpose or mission. Yet this narcissistic turn in foreign affairs has led only to incoherent, opportunistic and inept policy-making. Even supposed successes like Kosovo or Bosnia are hardly beacons of democratic peace and stability; while more recent interventions, in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, have produced appalling chaos with no obvious benefit for the intervening powers.

This is an equally confusing situation for radical critics who have tended to assume the existence of reasonably coherent elite interests, which compliant media then serve. In the peculiar circumstances of the present, there is some truth in the claim that the media continue to follow elite agendas, and in the apparently contradictory claim that there are unprecedented levels of media criticism and unruliness. It is surely the case, for example,
that as Robinson et al. demonstrate, most mainstream coverage of Iraq slavishly reproduced the perspective of official Western sources. Yet it is also true that the sort of unruly or chaotic media behaviour described by McNair was much in evidence, including in the mainstream, although what he identifies as critical reporting would be better characterised as a cynical self-consciousness. The same impulse which has repeatedly led politicians to seek meaning and purpose in international affairs has at the same time made the conduct of war acutely image-conscious, encouraging an ironic, distanced style of coverage (see further Hammond 2007). More genuinely critical perspectives were of course available, notably online. Yet as Jodi Dean (2005: 52) observes, ‘despite the terabytes of [online] commentary and information, there wasn’t exactly a debate over the [Iraq] war’. Equally, despite the subservience of much of the mainstream, there wasn’t exactly a consensus either. The idea of a ‘non-linear’ and ‘diffuse’ world of ‘emergence’ captures something of how things appear from the perspective of a confused and disconnected elite who have trouble coming up with a coherent message, who cannot rely on media or audiences to react in predictable ways, and who are necessarily less able than in the past to control today’s global, multi-perspectival information environment. Yet if there has been a conceptual ‘implosion’ in the way Hoskins and O’Loughlin describe, it is better understood in terms of politics rather than technology. The radical critique has limited traction now because we are no longer living in a universe of Left and Right where coherent political worldviews confront one another.

The influence of the radical critique has varied depending on circumstances and the fortunes of the wider political Left. In Britain, as Curran (2002: 39, 141) recounts, following the ‘high-water mark of this tradition’ in the 1970s, its ‘self-immolation’ in the 1980s paralleled the decline and defeat of the labour movement and the Left during that decade. He has in mind the sorts of theoretical debates described by Greg Philo and David Miller (2001) as the ‘dead ends of media/cultural studies’, which largely revolved around the question of the public, dividing between those who foregrounded the ability of audiences to contest dominant meanings versus those who emphasised the ideological influence of the media. The unfortunate implication was that to be radical was to insist on people’s vulnerability to potent media messages; a position which also provided an alibi for the Left’s declining influence. Around the same time, government antipathy toward the BBC led many to turn a critique of private ownership into a defence of state regulation (Curran 2002: 124). Curran seems confident that the radical tradition continues and can be renewed, but although contemporary analyses of the media sometimes seem to echo the radical critique of the past, the political content is usually quite different. Today, ritualistic denunciations of neoliberalism may sound radical, but are often accompanied by enthusiastic support for ever-greater state control of the media (Garland and Harper 2012); and in regard to questions of war and conflict a sense of political disorientation is even more evident as self-styled leftists and radicals are often the most fervent advocates of Western intervention (Herman and Peterson 2011: xviii).

In its earlier formulations, the radical tradition always assumed the possibility of large-scale social transformation and implicitly addressed a political subject who could carry such change through. With the collapse of established Left/Right politics, though, that assumption can no longer be made. It would be difficult to overstate the implications of the political changes that have happened since the end of the Cold War, a historic shift which represented the end of modernist politics. When Walter Lippmann and others initially wrote of the ‘manufacture’ or ‘engineering’ of consent in the aftermath of the First World War, they were voicing elite fears about the threat to capitalist order posed by a politically active public (Carey 1997). Often expressed in terms of worries about popular passions and irrational forces
which needed to be controlled, elite concerns were prompted by the tumultuous entry of the masses into public life in an era of war, revolution and economic upheaval. When radical critics in the late 1960s and 1970s set out to challenge the ideological role of the media, they did so in the context of a lively Left political culture and robust working-class organisation. Today, by contrast, the concerns of Western elites centre on public disengagement from politics and the difficulty of finding points of connection with electorates. Now when thinkers such as Lippmann are invoked it is because they address the question of how to understand the formation of publics in (what would now be called) a complex, globalised world, in which previous frameworks of political representation and identification appear hollow and unappealing (Marres 2005). In such circumstances, much ‘radical’ critique often seems either to echo elitist assumptions about the vulnerability of media audiences or to reinforce popular disengagement from politics.

Complexity approaches are certainly sensitive to change, but offer no alternative, since from this perspective ‘power relations can easily evaporate into complex processes of indirect interconnection’ (Chandler 2014: 123). Political and military power have hardly become any less of a problem just because we live in a ‘globalised’ or interconnected world. Indeed, the arbitrary and incoherent exercise of power by today’s purposeless elites is arguably even more destructive and dangerous than the imperialism of old. Furthermore, critics who interpret today’s ‘chaotic’ media culture as critical and democratic are obliged to ignore the extent to which journalists have frequently joined with great enthusiasm in the pursuit of narcissistic foreign policy, urging greater projection of Western military power in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East. The assumption that the free Western media play the democratic role of holding power to account looks just as questionable as it always did, even though we need to refine how we understand the problem and respond to it.

What was good about the radical tradition at its best was that it abstracted from the particular to draw out the underlying dynamics of media performance in capitalist democracies, with a clear sense that this was fundamentally shaped by wider socio-economic arrangements. Its most problematic legacy is that a critique of private ownership has morphed into advocacy of ever more state regulation, as if the problem all along was too much media freedom (Hume 2012). Having begun from the premise, highlighted at start of this chapter, that the key thing to explain was how the free media of democratic societies act as agents of power despite relatively little direct state interference, today the aim of much media criticism seems to be to encourage greater official regulation (Media Reform Coalition 2012). Such an approach seems more likely to encourage a climate of conformity than to disrupt it. The presumption used to be that by identifying structures of power these could be resisted and overturned, but such is our contemporary failure of political imagination that perhaps it not so surprising if, set against the apparent fluidity of the networked world, to many observers this approach now looks more like ‘reifying’ power structures than challenging them.

Notes
2 According to the Pew Research Center, even in a highly ‘wired’ nation such as the US, most people still turn to TV as their main source of news; while of the 38 per cent who go online for news, even the heaviest users spend on average only four minutes per day on online news sites (Olmstead et al. 2013). The two most popular social networking sites, Facebook and YouTube, are used as a source of news by 30 per cent and 10 per cent of the US population respectively (Holcomb et al. 2013). According to Ofcom (2013), in the UK 78 per cent of people view TV
news and 32 per cent use the Internet for news, with over half of the latter using the BBC website.

References


